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Abstract
A succession of doctrines have been advocated in the past for en-
hancing cybersecurity: prevention, risk management, and deterrence
through accountability. None has proved eective, and their failings
are discussed. Proposals are now being made to view cybersecurity
as a public good or to adopt mechanisms inspired by those used for
public health. This landscape is surveyed through the lens that a new
doctrine|public cybersecurity|provides.
1 Introduction
Governments, business, and individuals are growing increasingly concerned
about the security of networked computing systems. This concern is justi-
ed. Press reports of successful attacks grow ever more frequent: cross-site
scripting used to pilfer consumers' passwords, large-scale breaches of corpo-
rate customers' personal information, massive distributed denial of service
attacks on web sites, cyber espionage aimed at classied documents, and all
manner of attacks on civil critical infrastructures.
Computer Scientists and those who fund them are, consequently, in-
vesting heavily in technological means for improving cybersecurity. But
technological solutions are useless if they are not deployed or if operating
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1practices allow them to be circumvented by attackers. Policy must create
incentives for system developers, operators, and users to act in ways that en-
hance rather than weaken system security. Moreover, neither technologists
nor policy makers have the luxury of starting with a clean slate. All must
labor in the shadows of legacy networks and end-systems that are not secure
(nor easily made so) and in the context of extant policy that reects societal
values from a time when dependence on networked information systems was
minimal.
Enhanced levels of cybersecurity can entail tensions involving cost, func-
tion, convenience, and societal values such as openness, privacy, freedom of
expression, and innovation. Absent some widely accepted doctrine, evalua-
tion of proposals for improvement is dicult and debate about their adoption
can be neither compelling nor conclusive. The utility of a doctrine is thus
determined by the extent to which it oers a framework for resolving these
tensions but does not impose, ignore, or rule out possible technical or policy
solutions.
We thus conclude that a prerequisite for achieving enhanced cybersecu-
rity is articulating a cybersecurity doctrine, which species goals and means.
 Goals. These dene some agreed upon kinds and levels of cyberse-
curity, characterizing who is to be secured, at what costs (monetary,
technical, convenience, and societal values), and against what kinds of
threats. The goals might be absolute or they might specify a range
of permissible trade-os. In allowing trade-os, we acknowledge the
political nature of cybersecurity and the need for conversations among
those aected when goals are set.
 Means. These might involve technological, educational, and/or regu-
latory measures. We should expect a means to include policy that cre-
ates incentives|which might range from market-based to coercive|
that foster adoption and/or deployment of the measures it proposes.
Through incentives provided as part of its means, a cybersecurity doctrine
can address barriers to market production of cybersecurity that others1 have
aptly noted reect a lack of will rather than a lack of ability. Incentives
also can prompt continued improvement to address the constantly emerging
landscape of threats and the new needs that arise as a growing range of
applications are being migrated to networked information systems.
1R. Anderson and T. Moore. The Economics of Information Security, Science 314
(5799), 610-613, October 27, 2006.
2One candidate for such a cybersecurity doctrine is the subject of this
paper. Our doctrine of public cybersecurity is rooted in the thesis that cy-
bersecurity is a public good. The focus of this doctrine, then, is on the
collective rather than on any single individual's or entity's computer, net-
work, or assets. Comparisons with public health|another public good|are
apt; these are made below.
The next section (x2) analyzes the limitations of various cybersecurity
doctrines that have been proposed to date. Then x3 discusses in detail
our new doctrine of public cybersecurity. The production of cybersecurity
by building systems that have fewer vulnerabilities is the subject of x4.
Subsequent sections discuss approaches for managing insecurity: diversity
(x5), surveillance (x6), installation of patches (x7), isolation (x8), and the
role of intermediaries (x9). Finally, x10 puts this work into perspective and
x11 oers some conclusions.
2 Cybersecurity Doctrines: Past and Present
The advent of time-sharing in the 1960's meant that computations on be-
half of multiple users were interleaved on a single computer. Each user's
computation and data thus had to be protected from misbehavior by pro-
grams being run by other users. Confronted by a problem born of technol-
ogy, engineers of early time-sharing systems sought solutions in technology.
Therefore, the focus of early cybersecurity doctrine was on developing new
technology. Societal values could be and were ignored, because users of these
early computing systems had shared values which meant those values would
be respected without explicit discussion.
Technological solutions for creating the needed isolation were beyond our
capabilities, especially when users could be motivated and capable adver-
saries bent on disrupting another user's computation or stealing information.
Improved technology, however, is not the only way to solve problems that
technology has created, and subsequent cybersecurity doctrines focused on
policy to leverage those technological solutions that were at hand. These
doctrines too were unsuccessful. But had they succeeded, they ultimately
would have been inadequate because the problem was changing.
Computer systems were becoming pervasive, which had two broad con-
sequences. First, the information technology sector became a signicant
economic force. Concerns about freedom to innovate and success in the
marketplace come with this rst consequence. The second consequence was
that computer systems increasingly touched the lives of ordinary people, as
3citizens whose records were stored electronically, and as workers who used
information technology to be more ecient. Eventually, computer networks
and the web were created; they changed how people shopped, communi-
cated, socialized and engaged in politics. As a consequence, privacy and
other societal values grew in importance. The requirement for a cybersecu-
rity doctrine to take account of societal values became crucial.
Because their eectiveness has been limited, it is instructive to review
the three doctrines that have dominated cybersecurity thinking for the past
50 years|the doctrines of prevention, risk management, and deterrence
through accountability. In particular, by analyzing the measures these doc-
trines propose, we might hope to gain insights into properties that cause
measures to be eective.
Doctrine of Prevention. The goal of this doctrine is systems that are
completely free of vulnerabilities. Absent vulnerabilities, attacks are not
possible, so the resulting system is secure.
Such absolute cybersecurity is worthwhile but unlikely ever to be achieved.
For systems that incorporate humans as users and operators, we would need
some way to prevent social engineering and intentional insider-malfeasance.
Prevention, here, requires overcoming the frailty of humans, which is likely
to involve more than technology.
If we ignore humans in a system then the problem is dierent but not
easier. Software systems today are just too large and complicated to be ver-
ied using formal logics. Researchers, assisted by computers, have been able
to devise formal proofs for small systems2 (i.e., under 10,000 lines of code),
and software producers regularly employ automated checking for relatively
simple properties of code and for analyzing specications. Techniques are
also being explored that reduce the size of code bases for certain key systems,
because a smaller code base is more amenable to formal verication.3 But
revolutionary advances are needed before formal verication could be used
to verify the entire code base found today on a desktop system or server,
yet that would be necessary for implementing the Doctrine of Prevention.
2Klien et al. seL4: Formal Verication of an OS Kernel. Proceedings of the ACM
SIGOPS 22nd Symposium on Operating Systems Principles, SOSP '09, (Big Sky, Montana,
USA), ACM, 207{220.
3For example, \prerendering" can reduce the code required to generate the user in-
terface in a voting system, thereby simplifying the vote-entry software and making it
more amenable to verication. Yee, Ka-Ping. Building Reliable Voting Machine Software.
Ph.D. Dissertation, Computer Science Department, University of California at Berkeley,
Fall 2007.
4System testing is the obvious alternative for gaining assurance that a
system has no vulnerabilities. Tests, however, only can reveal the presence
of vulnerabilities|not their absence. Exhaustive testing would be necessary
for demonstrating the absence of vulnerabilities, and the amount of work
involved here is prohibitive even for small components, much less for large
systems.
Formal proofs and testing are necessarily relative to some expectations
about what the system must do and the environments in which the system
will operate. So we must discharge the Doctrine of Prevention relative to
some expectations, which is tantamount to establishing the absence of vul-
nerabilities only if certain assumptions hold. Unfortunately, assumptions
about the environment that hold one day might subsequently be invali-
dated. Attacks evolve in sophistication in response to better defenses. And
threats emerge to exploit new opportunities for disruption that are created
when cyberspace provides access to new forms of value. So a system that
was once considered secure might not remain so for very long
In light of this dynamic, expectations about the environment must be
periodically revisited and, if necessary, revised. Thus the Doctrine of Pre-
vention involves a recurring expense. That recurring expense is inconsistent
with the business model employed by many of today's software providers,
which favors reuse and extension of existing hardware and software in order
to lower the cost of producing new systems.
The adoption of mandatory standards can be seen as a way to support
the Doctrine of Prevention by increasing the chances that what is built
and/or deployed has fewer vulnerabilities. Some standards directly con-
cern what functions an artifact must or must not support, some govern its
internal structure, while others concern the process by which the artifact
is constructed or maintained, and yet others govern qualications of the
personnel who are involved in creating the artifact. Examples include the
TCSEC4 (also known as the Orange Book), its successor the Common Cri-
4DoD Computer Security Center. Department of Defense Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria, CSC-STD-001-83, August 1983.
5teria5 as well as security provisions in information privacy laws6 7 8, the
Federal Information Security Management Act9, and the Voluntary Voting
System Guidelines10. Current market activity suggests that such mandates
show value in some areas. However, a correlation between the absence of
vulnerabilities and standards compliance has not yet been documented. So
the stated goal for the Doctrine of Prevention is unlikely to be achieved
through these measures.
Doctrine of Risk Management. Absolute cybersecurity is not aord-
able but, fortunately, it is also not needed for most systems. The Doctrine
of Risk Management responds by stipulating a more modest goal|that in-
vestments in security reduce expected losses from attacks. To adopt this
doctrine is to admit that all vulnerabilities are not equal; one should focus
only on vulnerabilities whose exploitation is (i) suciently likely by the per-
ceived threats and (ii) could enable system compromises that are expensive
(by some cost measure). In contrast to the Doctrine of Prevention, the more
modest goal of defending a smaller body of code against a more restricted
set of threats is likely within our capabilities. Moreover, to maintain that
steady state, fewer assumptions about the environment would have to be
revisited periodically.
In theory, the Doctrine of Risk Management seems quite sensible. But
the lack of information about vulnerabilities, incidents, and attendant losses
makes actual risk calculations dicult. Companies and individuals do not
know how to value (i) condentiality of information, (ii) integrity of infor-
mation, or (iii) the pain of dealing with recovery from an attack's eects
(e.g., bad credit ratings). And these costs seem to vary tremendously. Also,
5US National Institute of Standards. Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation,
1999. ISO Standard 15408. http://csrc.nist.gov/cc/.
6Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L.
No.104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (regulating the use and disclosure of \Protected Health
Information").
7Title V of Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338
(1999) (codied at 15 U.S.C. xx6801-6827 (2006)), 15 U.S.C. xx6801, xx6805 (empowering
various agencies to promulgate data-security regulations for nancial institutions).
8Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. x6501 et seq. (prohibiting the
collection of personally identiable information from young children without their parents'
consent).
9Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (\FISMA", 44 U.S.C. x3541,
et seq.).
10Election Assistance Commission. Draft Voluntary Voting Sys-
tem Guidelines, Version 1.1, May 27, 2009. Available at
www.eac.gov/testing and certication/voluntary voting system guidelines.aspx
6people have diculty reasoning about extremely low-probability events. Fi-
nally, investment incentives are missing when costs are borne by third par-
ties, materialize only well after the breach occurs, and causation is dicult
to discern much less prove.
Accurate information about threats and attacks may not be publicly
available because those with that knowledge fear tarnishing their reputa-
tions or compromising their intelligence methods and/or sources. Even were
that information available, deployment of replacement systems and upgrades
changes the uses to which systems are being put and alters the set of vul-
nerabilities, which in turn can lead to the creation of new attacks. These
dierences mean that the past is not a good predictor of the future. As a
consequence, actuarial models cannot be constructed, so insurance to trans-
fer risk is impossible to price in a way that ensures prots to the policy
underwriter.11
Were there some way to analyze a system mechanically and obtain a
quantity that indicates just how secure that system is, then we could have a
basis for assessing what is gained from specic investments made in support
of cybersecurity. But today such cybersecurity metrics do not exist. Quan-
tities derived entirely from empirical observations also don't work for justi-
fying investments. The absence of detected system compromises could indi-
cate that investments in defenses worked, attacks haven't been attempted,
or the compromise escaped notice (e.g., theft of condential information).
So whether or not prior security investments were well targeted is impossible
to know, leaving security professionals to justify investments based solely on
non-events.
Approaches based on risk management are further confounded by exter-
nalities that derive from the emergent nature of cybersecurity in networks.
Individuals and entities here can neither fully reap the benet of their se-
curity investment nor entirely control their vulnerability through invest-
ments.12 For example, a single compromised system anywhere in a network
can serve as a launching point for attacks on other systems connected to
that network. So local investment in defenses not only provides local ben-
ets but also benets others; and under-investment in defenses elsewhere
in the network could facilitate local harms. Absent coordination, the only
11Rainer Boehme and Galina Schwartz. Modeling Cyber-Insurance: To-
wards A Unifying Framework. Working paper presented at Workshop
on Economics of Information Security, Harvard University, June 2010.
http://weis2010.econinfosec.org/papers/session5/weis2010 boehme.pdf
12R. Anderson and T. Moore. The Economics of Information Security, Science 314
(5799), 610-613, October 27, 2006.
7logical strategy would be to invest in insurance (were it available), because
here an entity can reap the entire benet of that investment.13 However,
this strategy does nothing to improve security and, as noted above, viable
long-term business models for insurance do not exist today.
The situation for risk management is not completely bleak, though. In
the policy arena, state security breach notication laws14 can be viewed
as a risk management intervention. Signicant costs are incurred to no-
tify individuals and to manage the adverse publicity surrounding reportable
breaches. These potential costs act as a proxy for the costs of security fail-
ures to customers, forcing companies to internalize previously externalized
risks of security failures. The price tag on breaches also means that these
laws have created a set of data to use in risk and return on investment cal-
culations. However, the laws focus on only a narrow set of breaches and, as
a result, might articially skew the focus of investments.
Doctrine of Deterrence Through Accountability. This doctrine is
concerned with treating attacks as crimes, and it therefore focuses on infras-
tructure to perform forensics, identify perpetrators, and prosecute them. We
deter attacks by increasing the chances that perpetrators will be found and
prosecuted.15 Implementations of this doctrine require strong authentica-
tion technologies and surveillance of network activity. Robust forms of user
identity allow us to overcome the loose binding that exists today between
individuals and machines.16
Absent an eective means for retribution, this doctrine has no teeth and
fails. And eorts to punish perpetrators of cyber-attacks are not always fea-
sible in today's global environment. Attribution of actions by machines to
individuals is complicated, agreement about illegality is illusive, and cross-
13J. Grossklags, N. Christin, J. Chuang. A game-theoretic analysis of information se-
curity games. Proceedings of the 17th International World Wide Web Conference WWW
2008, (Beijing, China, April 2008).
14Security breach notication statutes that require companies to notify individuals when
certain personal data has been accessed or disclosed without authorization are in place
in 46 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. The rst was
California's Notice of Security Breach Law Cal.Civil Code x1798.29 (2002).
15Butler W. Lampson. Computer security in the real world. IEEE Computer 37(6),
June 2004, 37{46.
16South Korea currently requires internet users to attach their real names and resident
ID numbers when they post messages on the Internet. To accomplish this, Web sites that
allow posting must collect and conrm names and resident IDs with a government server.
Se Jung Park, Yon Soo Lim, Steven Sams, Sang Me Nam, and Han Woo Park, \Networked
politics on Cyworld: The text and sentiment of Korean political proles," Social Science
Computer Review, September 21, 2010.
8border enforcement requires more cooperation than is likely to emerge be-
tween important constellations of nations. Recent attacks against U.S. and
other systems suggest that we cannot ignore non-nation state actors that
engage in terrorism and large-scale nancial crimes. The very features that
make the internet a protable environment for criminals|world-wide reach,
connectedness, neutral treatment of packets, and weak binding of machines
to individuals|make it dicult for law enforcement to identify and catch
them, while other features of the international landscape make it dicult to
bring them to justice.17
There are also conceptual obstacles that limit the eectiveness of the
doctrine. First, this doctrine is punitive. Like most criminal law, it is aimed
primarily at punishing with expectations of producing both general and
specic deterrence. This does little to keep networks up and running when
they are under siege nor does it prompt proactive security investments.
Second, the doctrine could require individuals to sacrice privacy and, in
the extreme, abandon the possibility of anonymity and the protections for
freedom of speech and association it aords.
Nevertheless, many attacks are indeed criminals plying their trade, and
it makes good sense that criminal activity in cyberspace face the risk of
retribution that we employ to deter criminal activity in the physical world.
The Doctrine of Deterrence Through Accountability thus brings value here.
But in cyberspace, unlike in the physical world, terrorists or state actors are
dicult to distinguish from common criminals.18 Deterrence through ac-
countability is not necessarily eective against these trans-national threats.
Other doctrine is also required.
3 A New Doctrine: Public Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity is non-rivalrous and non-excludable so, by denition, it is a
public good. It is non-rivalrous because one user beneting from the security
of a networked system does not diminish the ability of any other user to
benet from the security of that system. And it is non-excludable because
users of a secure system cannot be easily excluded from benets security
brings. Doctrines to foster the production of public goods thus constitute a
sensible starting point in our search for doctrines that promote cybersecurity.
17J. Franklin, V. Paxson, A. Perrig, and S. Savage. An inquiry into the nature and
causes of the wealth of internet miscreants. Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security (CCS '07). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 375-388.
18William J. Lynn III. Defending a new domain. The Pentagon's Cyberstrategy. Foreign
Aairs, September/October 2010.
9Economists dene a common good as one that is rivalrous and non-
excludable. The sea, outer space, and air are examples. In so far as common
goods (by denition) are inherently dierent from public goods, doctrines for
common goods are likely to be unsuitable for fostering cybersecurity. Indeed,
we can see this irrelevance in laws for protecting common goods, which
typically aim to ensure rights of equal use, and in the mechanisms these
laws introduce, which are intended to manage the depletion and inequitable
consumption by rst comers or more sophisticated users. The production of
cybersecurity has little to do with any of these issues.
3.1 Public Health as an Exemplar
Public health|the prevention of disease and promotion of good health in
populations writ large|is a public good. It is non-rivalrous because having
the population healthy implies a lower prevalence of disease, which in turn
decreases the chances any member can fall ill. And it is non-excludable
because nobody can limit an individual's ability to prot from the health
benets that living amongst a healthy population brings.
The essential characteristics of public health law are a focus on the health
of the population as a whole and the singular responsibility of government
in that enterprise.19 To discharge these responsibilities, various agencies are
mandated to engage in a broad set of activities, which include the following.
 Public education about the cause and eects of disease, as well as
methods of prevention, since that education empowers individuals to
act in ways that optimize their own health, which in turn furthers
public health.
 Creation and use of methods for the prevention and treatment of spe-
cic diseases. This could involve (i) providing subsidies to procure care
needed by those who could not otherwise aord it20 or (ii) imposing
specic health standards as eligibility requirements for various societal
19The mission of public health was dened by an inuential Institute of Medicine
Committee as \fullling society's interest in assuring conditions in which people can be
healthy". The Future of Public Health, Institute of Medicine, 1988 p. 7. A rich description
of the legal framework is set out in Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Law: Power, Duty,
Restraint, University of California Press, January 2001.
20For example, after several outbreaks of measles among primarily unvaccinated chil-
dren, a federal law was passed to provide free vaccines to certain groups of children and
to provide funds to states to support eorts to enhance vaccination levels.
10benets.21
 Identication and management of disease and infected individuals though
surveillance, information gathering, and analysis|including manda-
tory reporting requirements for certain diseases and conditions, manda-
tory testing or screening for others, symptom surveillance that seeks to
identify non-obvious public health threats in masses of routine records,
and mandatory treatment.
While interests of an individual and the public often align, it is the
points of conict that public health law speaks to|by setting out the rights
of individuals as sovereigns over their physical bodies versus the obligation
of the state to protect the population as a whole and by oering frameworks
to mediate conicts between the two.
As an example, public health mandates that children be vaccinated be-
cause in a generally healthy population such vaccinations cannot be justied
based on the benet to the individual. In fact, the optimal choice for any
given child might be to avoid vaccination and thus avoid the risk of side-
eects. What mandatory vaccination creates is herd immunity, which ben-
ets the collective by reducing the total number of hosts available to carry
a disease, thereby decreasing the risk to individuals who have not been vac-
cinated. However, if too many individuals act in their own self-interest and
eschew vaccinations, then the herd immunity that allowed a non-vaccinator
to freeload may disappear. This is a \tragedy of the commons" where indi-
viduals acting rationally leave everyone worse o.
Every state in the U.S. conditions a child's attendance at school on sat-
isfying some specied regimen of vaccinations. And, in addition, vaccine
manufacturers are indemnied from liability for side-eects users might ex-
perience. Specically, the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP)
provides certain payouts from public coers to children injured as a result of
a vaccine. VICP also provides a compensation mechanism outside seeking
damages from the vaccine manufacturers, thereby providing an environment
conducive to both the production and willing use of vaccines. While this
cannot fully compensate for negative health consequences from vaccinations,
it is an important component of the overall public health strategy.
Public health is a logical outgrowth of having disease detection and pre-
vention mechanisms, which transformed societal perception of health from
a primarily private concern to a concern of the collective. Ultimately, this
21As discussed later, children in the United States are eligible to attend public school
only after receiving a mandated set of vaccinations.
11led to public health being seen as a public good that the government should
enable.22 With a focus on the collective, health now becomes intertwined
with societal values. For example, we impinge on societal values when we
introduce mandatory reporting and surveillance systems that (i) alert in-
dividuals at specic risk so they can be tested and treated, and (ii) allow
isolation, quarantine, and even mandatory treatment to be imposed. At the
same time, public health interventions aim to minimize their intrusiveness
due to the chilling eect they may have on access to healthcare. Thus, we
pursue programs such as anonymous HIV testing and needle exchange.
This same public health framework (viz, laws, agencies, and measures)
applies equally well to weaponized pathogens. This is not to suggest that
motive is irrelevant in considering public health strategies. For example,
weaponized pathogens may change more quickly than those that evolve in
nature, and certainly the transmission vectors may dier when pathogens
are used as weapons. But the basic tools of public health still apply: public
education (to minimize exposure and facilitate early detection), investments
to create means for prevention and treatment (antidotes and vaccines), and
surveillance and analysis (facilitating isolation and quarantine as defenses).
3.2 From Public Health to Public Cybersecurity
Public health and cybersecurity both aim to achieve a positive state (health
or security) in a loosely aliated but highly interdependent network. With
one, it is a network comprised primarily of people existing in an environment
over which they have some limited control; with the other, the network is
comprised of people, software, and hardware (for communications, storage,
and processing). And because this positive state is ultimately unachievable,
both struggle with how to manage in its absence as well as with how to
prompt its production. Success ultimately depends not only on technical
progress but on reaching a political agreement about (i) the relative value
of some public good in comparison to other societal values and (ii) the
institutions granted authority to resolve conicts (and the methods they
use).
We dene a doctrine of public cybersecurity to be any cybersecurity doc-
trine whose goals are (i) producing cybersecurity and (ii) managing insecu-
rity23 that remains, where political agreement balances individual rights and
22The Future of Public Health, Institute of Medicine, 1988 p. 3.
23Systems that employ technical means to enable continued operation in the face of
attacks are sometimes called intrusion tolerant. A sampling of specic techniques for
achieving intrusion tolerance is discussed in Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems
12public welfare. There is no single doctrine of public cybersecurity. Dierent
denitions for what is meant by \cybersecurity" and \insecurity" as goals24
lead to dierent doctrines of public cybersecurity. Also, dierent choices of
measures and incentives that together constitute the means result in dier-
ent doctrines of public cybersecurity. But none of the doctrines discussed in
x2 has all of the elements we require in a doctrine of public cybersecurity.25
The analogy with public health inspires cybersecurity measures like pre-
vention, containment, mitigation, and recovery|strategies that direct re-
sources toward production and preservation of cybersecurity. But modern
public health doctrine does not compensate victims of disease, so by analogy,
a doctrine of public cybersecurity would not focus on restitution. Indeed,
restitution is economically ecient only when attacks are infrequent, and
that assumption is not realistic today.
Modern public health also does not punish victims of disease, though
there is some nuance. Quarantine, in response to disease, benets the col-
lective by depriving an individual of certain freedoms. Such a response could
be seen as harsh consequences, which is one denition of \punishment". By
analogy, a doctrine of public cybersecurity could dictate responses that de-
prive individuals of actions, but only if those responses benet the collective.
Punishments solely for retribution could not be part of a public cybersecurity
doctrine (since retribution does not benet public welfare), though nothing
precludes implementing a doctrine of public cybersecurity alongside a cy-
bersecurity doctrine that does admit retribution. Finally, the parallel with
public health also suggests that prevention be preferred to recovery.
With regard to incentives, ensuring that actors contribute to public cy-
bersecurity requires interventions to overcome positive and negative exter-
nalities that lead rational individuals to under-invest, just like for public
health. And when incentives are insucient to prompt private provisioning,
the public interest requires making value-ridden choices to interfere with the
rights and interests of individuals and organizations. Those choices would
be embodied in goals that reect political agreement about the good in
(Jaynarayan Lala, editor), IEEE Computer Society, Order Number PR02057, ISBN 0-
7695-2057-X, 2003. Uses of the term \managing insecurity" in this paper are intended to
denote something broader, admitting non-technical means as well as intrusion tolerance
techniques.
24H. Nissenbaum, Where Computer Security Meets National Security. Ethics and In-
formation Technology, Vol. 7, No. 2, June 2005, 61-73.
25Doctrine of Prevention is not concerned with managing insecurity; Doctrine of Risk
Management and Doctrine of Deterrence Through Accountability are not concerned with
producing cybersecurity. And none concern trade-os of individual rights for public wel-
fare.
13question (its denition), the socially desirable level given competing priori-
ties and values, and provisions for determining when the individual's desires
yield to the collectives' need. For example, an agreement might stipulate
that state coercion is permitted only when certain incursions into the rights
and interests of individuals are tightly circumscribed.
Public health solutions don't always translate into sensible support for
public cybersecurity, but we have been pleasantly surprised at how often the
former inspires strategies for the latter. Below, we explore some examples.
These also illustrate how doctrines of public cybersecurity can be useful for
evaluating current cybersecurity proposals. Our choice of examples should
not, however, be seen as an endorsement for any particular proposed set of
interventions.
4 Producing Security during Development
Underutilized approaches (e.g., formal methods, testing, and improved soft-
ware engineering processes and standards) that were developed, in part, to
serve the Doctrine of Prevention are eective in producing cybersecurity
(by reducing the number of vulnerabilities present in a system), even if they
cannot produce absolute cybersecurity. Thus, methods do exist that could
serve as a means for a doctrine of public cybersecurity, just like disease
prevention through vaccination and the monitoring of our food and water
supplies fosters public health. The question is: What incentive structures
would ensure that these methods are used?
Education could play a key role in defect reduction. Knowledgeable
developers are less likely to build systems that have vulnerabilities. They
are also better able, thus more likely, to embrace leading-edge preventions
and mitigations. There is, however, no agreement about what should be
taught. To reach that agreement would require a dialog among universities
and with practitioners.
Once agreement has been reached about a body of knowledge for cyber-
security practitioners, we could require that mastery of this material be
certied as a condition for practice. But the details of how certication is
handled can be subtle. Possession of a certicate does not by itself compel
the use of best practices, and it is easy to imagine certied system-builders
who cut corners by choice (out of laziness, for example) or by mandate
(because management is trying to reduce costs). Moreover, unless the certi-
cation process imposes a continuing education requirement to ensure that
certicate holders will stay current with new developments, it might impede
14rather than promote the spread of innovation. And even when continuing
education is mandated, old habits die hard; physicians, for example, who
have been shown new methods, empirically demonstrated to be superior,
nevertheless exhibit a tendency to stick with familiar practices.26
Employing practices to reduce defects during system development and
employing better-educated practitioners will mean systems become more ex-
pensive to produce. Today's software-procurement market does not provide
incentives that would prompt developers to incur those additional expenses.
Moreover, purchasers are unable to predict the costs of a system's vulnera-
bility to attack and, without ways to measure a system's security, have no
way to rationalize paying higher prices|the same underlying reasons that
the Doctrine of Risk Management failed.
Law could force system producers and/or purchasers to make the neces-
sary investments. Software distributors currently disclaim liability beyond
the purchase price for damages caused by their product. This probably re-
duces the time and energy that developers devote to eliminating defects,
as evidenced by the number of buer overruns and other exploitable cod-
ing errors still being discovered and exploited by attackers. The law could,
for example, be revised to disallow limits on damages owing from attacks
that exploit poor coding practices that lead to buer overows and other
easily exploited vulnerabilities. Limits on liability could depend on the use
of formal methods, type safe languages, or specic forms of testing (e.g.,
fuzz testing27). Creation of a class of certied security professionals also
could provide the basis for a professional duty of care supporting liability
for shoddy security.
Law also could require that software developers adhere to security stan-
dards. Or safe harbor provisions could be created to protect software de-
velopers against future ndings of liability for those systems built according
to specied standards. In fact, the law arguably already mandates that
companies follow certain standards regarding personally identiable infor-
mation. Through a set of settlement agreements, the Federal Trade Com-
mission established a de facto standard that requires a company collecting
and handling personal information of consumers (i) to establish reasonable
security processes and (ii) to mitigate system vulnerabilities that are known
in the marketplace and for which mitigations exist. A rst step in deter-
26Deborah G. Mayo and Racehelle D Hollander. Acceptable Evidence: Science and
Values in Risk Management. Oxford University Press, 1994
27In fuzz testing, a system is exposed to random inputs of unexpected kinds. This form
of testing reveals inadequacies in the input validation routines of a system. Several classes
of attacks are blocked by implementing stringent input validation.
15mining whether law should more broadly mandate the adoption of security
standards might be research that identies connections between security
development processes and good security outcomes.28
5 Managing Insecurity: Diversity
Monocultures in nature risk extinction from pathogens and have less chance
of adapting to changing conditions. Diversity|of the individuals within
each species and by virtue of many species co-existing within an ecosystem|
is one way nature creates a resilient ecosystem. Public health benets from
individuals in a population having dierent inherent resistance to pathogens
and, by virtue of the dierent exposures29 to diseases that each experiences,
having dierent immunities.
Although nature abhors monocultures, cyberspace seems to favor them.
A collection of identical computing platforms is easier, hence cheaper, to
manage because we need master only one interface and make one set of
conguration decisions. In addition, user training costs are reduced when
job transfers do not have the overhead of learning yet another operating
system and suite of applications; investments in education about how to use
or manage a system also now can be amortized over a larger user base in a
monoculture. Finally, interoperability of a few dierent kinds of systems is
far easier to orchestrate than integrating a diverse collection, standards not
withstanding. So networking is usually easier to support with a monocul-
ture. Mindful of these advantages, the public and private sectors both tend
to adopt procurement policies that foster creating computer monocultures.30
28For a case-study comparison of four vulnerability reduction techniques see K. Buyens,
B. De Win, W. Joosen: Empirical and statistical analysis of risk analysis-driven tech-
niques for threat management. ARES 2007: 1034-1041, Proceedings First International
Workshop on Secure Software Engineering (SecSE 2007). For a theoretical comparison of
two high-prole development processes (Microsoft SDL and the Open Web Application
Security Project's Comprehensive, Lightweight Application Security Process (CLASP) see
Johan Gregoire, Koen Buyens, Bart De Win, Riccardo Scandariato, and Wouter Joosen:
On the secure software engineering process: CLASP and SDL compared. In SESS'07:
Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Software Engineering for Secure Sys-
tems, Minneapolis, MN, USA, May 2007.
29Vaccination works by causing exposure to a relatively benign form of the disease
against which protection is being sought.
30A notable example is U.S. Oce of Management and Budget policy memorandum
M-07-11 \Implementation of Commonly Accepted Security Congurations for Windows
Operating Systems" which lists the permitted versions of Windows that should be used
by certain civilian federal agencies. See www.cio.gov/documents/FDCC memo.pdf.
16Methods do exist, however, to articially and automatically create di-
versity in software systems|and do so without sacricing the advantages
given above for having a monoculture. These methods involve tools that
randomly transform code and/or stored information in semantics-preserving
ways. Due to the articial diversity, internal details of an individual system
are no longer predictable. So an attack that exploits knowledge of internal
details is more likely to cause a system crash after a small number of instruc-
tions than to cause an attacker to receive control. In many settings, having
a system crash is preferable to it being controlled by attackers. Moreover, a
platform that crashes in response to an attack cannot then help propagate
that attack to other platforms. The crash also (implicitly) signals system
operators that something is wrong, creating an opportunity for initiating
other means to block an attack's spread.
As with the diversity found in nature, articial diversity is inherently a
probabilistic defense, because an attack against any given individual compo-
nent might not be derailed by the specic random transformations that were
made to that component. Also, by converting some attacks into crashes, ar-
ticial diversity can adversely aect a system's availability.
Despite these limitations, articial diversity does facilitate public cy-
bersecurity because it provides a way to cope with residual vulnerabilities,
thereby providing a way to manage insecurity. Today, articial diversity is
often used in operating systems but less so in applications31 (even though
increasingly it is applications that attackers target). However, the various
legal approaches discussed above in x4 for incentivizing defect reduction dur-
ing development are equally well suited for incentivizing system producers
to support articial diversity. So a rich space of incentives is at hand for
encouraging broader adoption of the measure.
6 Managing Insecurity: Surveillance
Surveillance is used extensively in support of public health, where data is
collected through a variety of means. The data enables disease containment
and mitigation through
 the dissemination of information that facilitates individual actions to
avoid exposure to infection,
31D. Ladd et al. The SDL Progress Report. Mi-
crosoft Corporation, 2001. page 23{24. Available at
http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/en/details.aspx?FamilyID=918179A7-61C9-
487A-A2E2-8DA73FB9EADE&displaylang=en.
17 isolation and quarantine, which limit the interaction of aected indi-
viduals with the rest of the population, and
 mandatory treatment to reduce danger to the public.32
Data collection for public health occurs at many levels. At the lowest
level is the self-serving inclination of individuals themselves to assess their
well-being. Education equips individuals with a basic level of knowledge
about health indicators|normal body temperature, pulse, blood pressure,
and respiratory rate|as well as with simple precautions to limit infection
and the spread of disease (e.g., frequent hand washing). Other data is
collected by primary care providers in conjunction with annual check-ups
and, when symptoms require further analysis, at hospitals and other more-
advanced diagnostic facilities. Each successively higher level is concerned
with the overall health for a larger population and, thus, provides a natural
venue for constructing and analyzing larger data aggregations.
By minimizing the disclosure of information about an individual's health,
public health law strives to reduce one potential source of reluctance about
seeking health care|fear an individual might have about being shunned
because of a publicized health condition. Generally, identifying information
ows away from primary health care providers only in instances where aggre-
gation and/or analysis is necessary to identify signicant trends. And when
information does ow, eorts are undertaken to protect each individual's
privacy.
Surveillance in Networked Systems. In contrast to public health, co-
ordinated surveillance is not used extensively today in support of cyber-
security. Yet it would be feasible and advantageous to do so. Low-level
indicators about the basic \health" of a computer can be made available
by running built-in checking software (e.g., virus scanners and intrusion de-
tection systems). And each of the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that
constitutes the network has an infrastructure that facilitates monitoring of
events internal to its network as well as interactions with other networks.
Surveillance of network trac (volume, distribution over time and des-
tinations, etc.) could be a powerful potential source of information about
certain attacks and vulnerabilities. Denial of service attacks, for example,
have an obvious manifestation and a natural mitigation based on trac l-
tering by ISPs. However, the source(s) of such attack packets, the target(s),
32The general rule allows individuals to refuse treatments. Some states mandate treat-
ments for communicable diseases, such as tuberculosis, that pose a danger to the public.
18and the intermediaries are likely to span multiple ISPs, which would have
to share data and coordinate for mitigation. Data sharing among ISPs is,
unfortunately, inhibited today by competition and, in some cases, varied
interpretations of privacy law.33 So ISPs are less able to have situational
awareness that could enable them to suppress packets delivering attacks.
Widespread sharing of information, however, can introduce a risk if chances
are now increased that attackers learn about vulnerabilities for specic sites.
Just as there are privacy issues with collecting data about an individual's
health, network trac surveillance raises privacy concerns. The extent to
which collecting packets actually does impinge on privacy depends on what
information is recorded, how long it is stored, how it is used, who can have
access to the information, etc. For example, realtime responses to protect
networks can be accomplished by authenticating machines, a far less po-
litically fraught solution than proposals for \internet drivers licenses" and
other tight bindings between machines and individuals.34
ISP cooperation and information sharing is less likely to raise privacy
concerns than collection of information by centralized government organiza-
tions. Yet the packets themselves can be invaluable to a government seeking
situational awareness about threats in cyberspace, and defense of its citizens
is a clear responsibility of government. Unfortunately, packet inspection is
also easily abused by a government for spying on citizens; critics cite this
fear (among others) when discussing the Einstein35 systems recently de-
ployed by the U.S. Government for monitoring all federal civilian agency
connections to the internet. As with public health, political agreement must
be reached based on the expected benets (backed by sound research and
eld experience) of surveillance and the risk it poses to other values.
An understanding of the kinds vulnerabilities found in systems is a form
of situational awareness of potentially great value to system builders. In the
absence of mandatory reporting requirements for cybersecurity incidents, a
diverse collection of public and private reporting mechanisms have evolved.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (US-CERT) and the NIST
Computer Security Division maintain databases of common vulnerabilities.
33M. Van Eeten and J. M. Bauer. Economics of malware: security decisions, in-
centives and externalities. OECD STI Working Paper 2008/1. OECD. Available at
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/17/40722462.pdf.
34See, D. D. Clark and S. Landau. Untangling Attribution. National Security Journal
Vol. 2, Issue 2 (2011). http://harvardnsj.com/2011/03/untangling-attribution-2/.
35Center for Democracy and Technology, Einstein Intrusion Detec-
tion System: Questions That Should Be Addressed, July 28, 2009.
http://cdt.org/security/20090728 einstein rpt.pdf.
19Many organizations contribute, but these are not the only such databases
and none provides anything close to a complete view. Some vulnerabili-
ties do not get reported to any. For example, a private sector community
of \security researchers" search systems for vulnerabilities but report their
ndings to middlemen, who oer it for sale to companies that build and
sell anti-malware or intrusion prevention/detection products.36 The ad hoc
Concker Working Group37 is an example of a rather successful coordinated
private-sector activity formed to defend against a particular attack.
7 Managing Insecurity: Patching
A patch is an update that can be applied to an installed system in order
to eliminate one or more previously identied vulnerabilities. Exploitation
of an unpatched vulnerability on a computer could target that machine
and assets of the individual and, therefore, be fully internalized. Or the
exploitation could target the machines and systems of others, producing
a negative externality.38 This uncertainty about consequences means that
self-interest of machine owners is not a strong incentive to apply patches.
Various policy interventions could raise patch rates, though. Choosing
among them requires additional information about why people and busi-
nesses delay or outright fail to apply patches.
 Research might conclude that low patch rates in the consumer market
are caused by an under-appreciation of the risks. Public education
that applying patches improves cybersecurity might then dramatically
increase patching.
 We might nd that individuals lack awareness of vulnerabilities present
on their machines. Here, built-in software to check whether all current
patches have been applied might suce for triggering consumers to be
more attentive to downloading patches for their machines.
 Feedback about what others do, thereby creating new norms of behav-
ior, might lead to better patching practices. Researchers in other areas
36The risk that such vulnerabilities might be sold or disclosed to irresponsible or hostile
parties is cause for concern about this kind of market, though the structure ourishes in
the absence of alternatives.
37See www.conckerworkinggroup.org.
38For example, unpatched machines can be co-opted by attackers into a botnet. Such
collections of remotely-controlled machines are used today for a variety of illicit activities,
including generation of spam email and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks.
20have found that showing individuals how their behavior compares to
others taps into a competitive and/or social consciousness. So simple
statements that a great percentage of others have patched their ma-
chines and are doing their part for cybersecurity just might be enough
to push the laggards into applying patches.
 Research might nd that individuals or enterprises hesitate to install
patches for fear of destabilizing their other software. Reluctance by
individuals might be overcome if software vendors were more transpar-
ent about what specic congurations and applications they tested.
And enterprises that depend on home-grown software could have have
their fears somewhat assuaged if test suites could be provided for use
by patch developers.39 As a nal safety-net, we might require that
all software contain mechanisms whereby a patch that has been ap-
plied can easily be removed, and the system and data restored to the
pre-patch state.
 If the impediment to installing security patches is the time or expertise
needed then an obvious mitigation is to have vendors congure defaults
that automatically download and apply security patches.
 Consumers being charged for Internet access in proportion to the
amount of bandwidth they use will incur lower costs by not down-
loading patches, which could be an excuse to forgo installing security
patches. One solution, here, is to subsidize the bandwidth required
for such downloads; taris that distinguish between dierent kinds of
trac is another solution.
 Those who run pirated software might hesitate to install patches for
fear that the installation process would disable the illegal software
or detect and report it. Regulations could address this by prohibiting
security-patch installation from implementing functionality in support
of license-enforcement or any other form of intellectual property pro-
tection.
Incentives to apply patches could also have a useful indirect eect. If patch
installations are frequent and disruptive then consumers have reason to pre-
fer products that have fewer security vulnerabilities from the start. This, in
turn, pressures software producers to build and deploy more secure products.
39However, some enterprises regard their software and data as proprietary. They might
not be comfortable providing test suites to patch developers.
21Mandates to apply patches raise concerns about subsidizing the instal-
lation of patches40 and compensating injured parties when patches cause
harm. Losses from applying mandated patches, particularly where un-
acknowledged and uncompensated, will breed suspicion and resistance to
patching eorts. Thus, it seems advisable to consider back-stop measures,
analogous to what VICP provides to incentivize the use and production of
vaccines and to the process used at the Food and Drug Administration to
ensure vaccine ecacy.
8 Managing Insecurity: Isolation
Geological features, like mountains and oceans, have proved valuable in
protecting individuals and populations. And when natural boundaries are
absent, we build our own|fences to surround buildings and nations, often
with guards to control who is allowed to transit the border. Such boundaries
protect activities on one side from activities occurring on the other. A
boundary might limit travel in one direction or in both directions, and it
might be completely impervious or it might be selective about what may
pass. Neither is a panacea. An impervious boundary could block the good
with the bad; a selective boundary must employ some kind of lter, and
that lter might block things it shouldn't or pass things it should.
Firewalls, so-called network guards, intrusion detection/prevention sys-
tems, and \air gaps" are examples of mechanisms that implement boundaries
in networked systems.41 Data collected through surveillance can serve as the
basis for signatures, which are then used to dene lters, eectively creating
dynamic boundaries. Surveillance thus can lead to automatically-imposed
quarantines. And since attacks in networks propagate rapidly, automatic
response is especially attractive.
Ideally, we would deploy selective boundaries that block attacks but
nothing else. In practice, though, lters will be far from perfect.
 Filters that inspect packet payloads (known as deep packet inspection)
in addition to checking packet headers are ineective when packet
payloads are encrypted or otherwise obfuscated. Encryption is not
40Richard Clayton. Might governments clean up malware? Proceedings Ninth Annual
Workshop on Economics and Information Security WEIS10, (Cambridge, MA, June 2010).
41The term \air gap" originally referred to isolation caused when no wires are connected
to a given component. With the advent of wireless networking, the term's meaning has
broadened to denote isolation caused when the Laws of Physics ensure no signal can reach
the component.
22today used extensively in networks, but that could easily change. And
encryption is often used by attackers to evade detection. Moreover, it
is malware variants that often are being spread, where each variant is
obfuscated by applying a dierent random set of semantics-preserving
transformations. It is quite dicult and often impossible to construct
a signature that matches all variants by generalizing from a few.
 A lter might be designed either to (i) block packets and protocols
corresponding to known attacks or (ii) pass packets from protocols or
conveying content that is known to be normal. Filters that imple-
ment (i) are fooled by new attacks (in addition to suering limitations
described in the previous bullet). Filters that implement (ii) could
block previously unseen protocols and kinds of packets, which sties
innovation.
 Whether a packet is part of an attack could depend only on sender
intent. Consider a large number of request packets being sent to a web
server. Are many people trying to access the same particularly topical
content or is a denial of service attack is in progress? Sender intent is
the sole dierentiator.
There is also a human element to consider. Boundaries and lters must
be installed, congured, and managed by human operators, and people do
make mistakes. Moreover, when such a mistake allows unimpeded ow, then
the error might be dicult to detect until after it is too late.
Network providers are understandably reluctant to publicize details of
defenses, because revealing that information could help attackers. Yet we
do see example defenses in today's commercial networks, which create and
reference so-called \black lists" of sites whose communications will be ig-
nored and \white lists" of sites that are known to be trustworthy. Some
ISPs create a competitive advantage by oering a service to their customers
whereby suspicious inbound-trac spikes directed at that customer's site
will automatically prompt upstream ltering to block those suspicious pack-
ets. Denial of service attacks in such networks are harder to undertake, as
a result. Other ISPs monitor each endpoint, disconnecting it if outgoing
trac suggests that endpoint is compromised.42
A boundary might be deployed around a system (be it a single computer
or a network) that must be protected from attacks or it might be deployed
42OECD. Malicious software (malware): A security threat to the internet economy.
Ministerial Background Report DSTI/ICCP/REG(2007)5/FINAL, June 2008. Available
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/34/40724457.pdf.
23around a system that is likely to harbor attackers. Dierent incentives are
eective in each case. One natural scenario for direct government investment
occurs when security boundaries coincide with national ones. Systems in
dierent countries are subject to dierent laws, typically reecting dierent
societal values. A government might therefore justify installing a boundary
whenever systems subject to its laws are being connected to systems located
in a jurisdiction that allows system behavior the rst considers an attack.
Boundaries are more likely to accepted and eective when instigated by
the collective rather than by individuals. First, an individual is unlikely to
have the necessary authority for mandating changes to defenses on all of the
remote systems that could be involved in creating a quarantine. Second, the
possibility of freeloading means externalities limit the incentives that might
prompt owners or operators of networks or individual systems to make the
investments to support enforced isolation. Finally, an agent of the collective
would have the fuller picture that enables better signatures to be dened
for lters.
We see an example of such boundaries in recent proposals for deterrence
through accountability. Some have suggested that the internet be parti-
tioned into national or multi-national enclaves. Those enclaves that serve
the population we are trying to protect (i) run protocols that enable packet-
sender tracing and (ii) do not carry trac from enclaves where packet-sender
tracing is not supported or cannot be trusted. Accountability of attack pack-
ets back to an individual machine can now be supported in enclaves that
serve populations of concern.
With powerful enough lters, boundaries have the potential to intrude
on societal values. One concern arises when the dening lters not only
block packets that contain attacks but can be congured to block other
kinds of packets. Such a lter could be used to prevent data from leaving an
enclave, which makes it well suited for protecting condential information
against theft. But content lters also could allow governments to implement
censorship, as illustrated by the rewalls China has installed to protect that
nation's computing systems from receiving information in violation of local
laws about allowed speech. Deployed in the reverse direction, a content lter
could block someone from sharing information with others, thereby stiing
debate.
So there may be trade-os: societal values as well as potential benets
for the collective versus constraints on activities by individuals and business.
Moreover, no criteria for deciding where a system should be segregated will
be infallible. The result is a complex risk-management decision procedure
that society must prescribe, with imperfect information and unknowable
24consequences.
9 Managing Insecurity: ISPs as Intermediaries
The public health system leverages health professionals and other institu-
tions to inuence individuals' behavior. For example, health professionals
educate individuals about benets of vaccinations, schools demand confor-
mance with vaccination schedules, and airports screen passengers for symp-
toms during some infectious disease outbreaks. Intermediaries clearly play
an important role in public health strategies.
Intermediaries also have an important role to play in fostering cyber-
security. For example, in many cases today, network operators, such as
employers and universities, require that all machines on their networks run
virus detectors or malware detectors (with up-to-date signature les). These
intermediaries could require that all machines are up-to-date on security
patches. Similarly, some ISPs have chosen to notify subscribers when a
computer seems to be infected.43 At least one ISP restricts web surng un-
til the machine is cleaned-up, while another ISP reportedly quarantines any
compromised machine until it is clean.44
ISPs are well positioned to facilitate patching and, by monitoring trac,
to enforce isolation of machines harbouring certain malware. Yet ISPs today
have little incentive to engage in such behaviors, because in doing so they
incur the bulk of the costs while any costs from the infected machines is
more widely dispersed. Moreover, an ISP that disables or limits a machine's
access to the internet will likely bear the burden of assisting that customer
as she attempts the necessary repairs. Analysis45 suggest that the cost
incurred by an ISP in elding a customer's tech-support call approaches
the ISP's annual revenue from that customer. So by making this sort of
monitoring and clean-up a mandatory obligation for ISPs, we would not
43Elinor Mills, \Comcast pop-ups alert customers to PC infections"Cnet News, October
8, 2009 (discussing Comcast October 2009 announcement of a trial of an automated service
that will \warn broadband customers of possible virus infections" called Comcast Constant
Guard the pop-up notice of possible infection directs customers to resources to rid their
machine of infection, a similar service by Qwest, Customer internet Protection Program
that displayed a Web page warning to customers provided ways to remove the infection for
free before allowing them to surf the Web; and a similar older, now discontinued service
of SBC that quarantined computers until they were cleaned)
44Id
45Richard Clayton. Might governments clean up malware? Proceedings Ninth Annual
Workshop on Economics and Information Security WEIS10, (Cambridge, MA, June 2010),
page 5, footnote 2.
25only force action by the ISPs but we would also prevent consumers from
shopping around for ISPs with weaker security requirements.
More daunting are the potential costs an ISP might incur from making
an incorrect decision to disconnect a customer.46 To limit spam email, for
example, an ISP might block all bulk sending of email. But missives sent by a
political organization might then be blocked, resulting in unwanted attention
from advocacy groups and the press.47 And while the law is evolving to
provide ISPs who take steps designed to protect security with immunity
from suits brought by providers of malware, those users who suer losses
after installing required patches or system upgrades or suer due to isolation
might also le legal complaints. In summary, the costs of ISP intervention
present a formidable barrier to such action, but the law could remove these
disincentives.
A recent proposal48 by Lichtman and Posner argues that expanding ISPs
liability \for violations of cyber-security" would improve cybersecurity be-
cause (i) individual attackers are often either beyond the reach of the law
or are judgment-proof and (ii) because ISPs \can detect, deter, or otherwise
inuence the bad acts in question." The proposers speculate that ISPs could
detect cybersecurity violations by building proles of their users and looking
for trac anomalies, in a manner analogous to the monitoring of cardholder
purchases done by credit card companies. But anomaly detection with us-
able levels of delity has eluded cybersecurity researchers for decades (as
Lichtman and Posner openly admit), so implementing the proposal is not at
present feasible.
Still, a policy holding ISPs liable for the damage caused by infected ma-
chines running on their networks might encourage more diligence in mon-
itoring and xing their subscriber's machines. The details are subtle and
depend on the standard for liability|strict, knowledge based, etc. One (un-
desirable) outcome would be if the ISP undertakes less monitoring as a way
to avoid its duty to intervene.
Alternatively, we could provide indirect or direct subsidies to foster
cybersecurity-preserving activities by ISPs. For example, the government
46For a discussion of some of the issues raised by an ISP decision to
cut o broadband access due to infection see, George Ou, \Comcast head-
ing the right direction on cybersecurity" Digital Society Web site, October
9, 2009 http://www.digitalsociety.org/2009/10/comcast-heading-th-right-direction-on-
cybersecurity/.
47http://www.e.org/wp/noncommercial-email-lists-collateral-damage-ght-against-
spam.
48See generally Doug Lichtman and Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers
Accountable, 14 S. Ct. Econ. Rev. 221, 233-34 (2006).
26could create a centralized service for hosting patches or it could subsidize
bandwidth to all endpoints in order to ensure that cost or delay to download
a patch cannot become an impediment to installing that patch.
Given the decentralized and private provisioning of network resources
in this country and many others, guring out the role of intermediaries in
driving cybersecurity is essential. As in other areas, such as copyright, the
challenge is to establish policies that incentivize the desirable behavior while
minimizing impact on other values.
10 Discussion
A biological basis for cybersecurity has been discussed by computer scientists
for at least two decades. Their thrust has been to understand whether
computer networks can benet from implementing defenses like those that
have worked so well for protecting living things. So we see intrusion detection
systems that mimic pathogen detection by immune systems49 and software
defenses based on articial diversity.50 A recent white paper from DHS51
describes how a human immune system's response mechanisms might serve
as the blueprint for software that defends individual computers and networks
against cyber-attacks; much research remains to be done, though, before
those ideas are reduced to running code.
In contrast to this biological metaphor, which focuses on technical mea-
sures for blocking cyberattacks, the analogy between public health and cy-
bersecurity is primarily concerned with new policy and new institutions.
The notion of a Cyber-CDC, for example, has been attracting considerable
interest.52 Inspired by the existing Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention, the proposed Cyber-CDC would be a government institution that
provides leadership in organizing public and private sector strategies to en-
hance cybersecurity. It would also undertake data collection about threats
and attacks, analyze and disseminate that information (perhaps in partner-
49S. Forrest, A.S. Perelson, L. Allen, and R Cherukuri. Self-nonself discrimination in a
computer. Proceedings of the 1994 IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy
(Oakland, CA, May 1994).
50S. Forrest, A. Somayaji, and D. Ackley. Building diverse computer systems. Pro-
ceedings of the Sixth Workshop on Hot Topics in Operating Systems (Cape Cod, Mass,
1997).
51Department of Homeland Security. Enabling distributed security in cyberspace.
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nppd-cyber-ecosystem-white-paper-03-23-2011.pdf.
52National Cyber Leap Year Summit 2009, Co-chairs Report.
http://www.nitrd.gov/NCLYSummit.aspx
27ship with the private sector), serve as a repository for technical remedies,
and educate the public about best practices, defenses, and remedies.
An IBM white paper53 broadens the analogy. It proposes not only bor-
rowing from public health but also from public safety. The broader anal-
ogy leads to additionally recommending that a Cyber Federal Emergency
Management Agency be established and that a Cyber National Response
Framework be devised. Independently, Microsoft's Scott Charney has advo-
cated \device health" measurement and using a device \health certicate"
as a basis for controlling access by devices to network resources.54 Hunker,
instead of focusing on institutions, suggests that public health could be a
model for norms of behavior.55 Individuals are expected to satisfy those
norms; government institutions should focus on supporting the norms.
None of the aforementioned work includes a compelling argument for why
the analogy to public health is a suitable starting point for cybersecurity.
Public health informs people's behaviors (seemingly an obvious route to
enhanced cybersecurity) but so does religion (which is not being advocated
as a cybersecurity solution). We argued the analogy between public health
and cybersecurity by using economic theory to highlight their shared status
as public goods, since economics provides a vocabulary for talking about
externalities and incentives. So while viewing cybersecurity as a public good
is not new56 57 58 we seem to be the rst to use economics insights to justify
the analogy between public health and cybersecurity.
Our public cybersecurity doctrine also goes beyond prior work that ex-
plores cybersecurity counterparts for institutions and policies that have
served public health well. Public cybersecurity derives from identifying
cybersecurity counterparts to the goals of public health|not the institu-
tions of public health. First, through public health law, we gain and have
53Daniel B. Preito and Steven Bucci. Meeting the cybersecurity challenge: Empowering
stakeholders and ensuring coordination. White Paper, IBM U.S. Federal Division, Feb
2010.
54Scott Charney. Collective Defense. Applying Public Health Models to the Internet.
White paper available at http://www.microsoft.com/security/internethealth
55Jerey Hunker. U.S. International policy for cybersecurity: Five issues that won't go
away. Journal of National Security Law & Policy 4, 197{216.
56Benjamin Powell. Is cybersecurity a public good? Evidence from the nancial services
industry. Working Paper Number 57, The Independent Institute, March 15, 2001.
57Bruce H. Kobayashi. An economic analysis of the private and social
costs of the provision of cybersecurity and other public security goals. Work-
ing paper 26, George Mason University School of Law, 2005. Available at
http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/gmule/art26.
58Brent Rowe and Michale Gallagher. Private sector cyber security investment strate-
gies: An empirical analysis. RTI International, March 2006.
28exploited a powerful framework for balancing collective versus individual
interests. Second, just as managing disease is an important goal of public
health, managing insecurity is an important goal of public cybersecurity. We
thus advocate that the siren call for the production of \secure" systems and
networks be augmented with a mandate to manage the inevitable insecurity
that comes from the constant vulnerabilities and adversaries we face.
The goals of public cybersecurity focus on the collective. Individual high-
consequence systems, such as those that control critical infrastructures, are
not singled out. Why not instead just focus our eorts on a seemingly
smaller problem|making only the high-consequence systems secure? In
public health terms, why not focus only on keeping important [sic] people
healthy? Isolation is not a realistic proposition for either. Public health
teaches that it is easier to keep specic individuals healthy when everyone is
healthy. And so it will be with cybersecurity. If we foster the production of
cybersecurity generally and our networks are able to manage insecurity then
it will be easier to ensure that our high-consequence systems are secure.
Cybersecurity, like security in so many other contexts, involves trade-
os with other values.59 So conicts will have to be resolved between public
cybersecurity and other values or interests of specic individuals, entities,
and society at large. And a cybersecurity doctrine is obliged to provide
principles and processes to negotiate and resolve these. Public health already
oers principles to resolve such conicts for a public good.
First, an individual's decision is most drastically prescribed by the state
where that decision might directly impact the health of others, and the state
generally lacks the ability to coerce, when the health impact is primarily
on the individual. Change \health" to \security" and we obtain sensible
guidelines for public cybersecurity.
Second, public health guidance applied to how public cybersecurity should
deal with externalities suggests the following.
 The state's obligations and abilities to shape and override private
choices should turn on the extent to which they have a direct im-
pact on the security of the public broadly rather than the security of
an individual or entity.
 Where their decision may be poor due to a lack of information or
a misapprehension of the risks, the state's role should be aimed at
facilitating better individual decisions through information or gentle
59H. Nissenbaum, Where Computer Security Meets National Security. Ethics and In-
formation Technology, Vol. 7, No. 2, June 2005, 61-73.
29interventions that inuence the perception of risk, not supplanting
them.
 Where security choices of the individual will impact the security of
others, then the state can use a wider array of tools to alter behavior.
 Even where state action is permissible, impact on other societal values
must be considered in choosing among solutions.
 Whenever possible, opt for minimal interventions implemented in a
decentralized manner, so as to limit the negative impact they may
have on willingness to participate.
11 Conclusions
Cybersecurity is the obstacle to success of the information age. Though the
problem resides in technologies, the solution requires policies. It requires in-
tervention in the private choices of individuals, hard trade-os, and political
agreements that could span nations.
We believe that a doctrine of public cybersecurity can be the basis for
those policies. The doctrine establishes a framework for state incentives
and coercion that we believe is rational, defensible, and legitimate. It al-
ters the focus of cybersecurity to be on the collective rather than on the
individual; and it advocates that systems be built with fewer vulnerabilities
but acknowledges that systems will have vulnerabilities and must still be
resilient in the face of attacks. If adopted, public cybersecurity will reorient
public policy and discourse toward the proper goals of encouraging collec-
tive action to produce the public good of cybersecurity and managing the
insecurity that remains.
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